China and Japan – neighboring economical and military powers – view each other with disdain, harbor mostly negative stereotypes of i another, disagree on Japan'due south World State of war Ii legacy and worry about future confrontations.

The two E Asian nations accept a centuries-onetime relationship, punctuated by major conflict and strife. Most recently, Beijing and Tokyo have been at loggerheads nigh sovereignty over a group of uninhabited islands in the East China Bounding main, called the Senkaku by the Japanese and the Diaoyu by the Chinese.

Today, only 11% of the Japanese limited a favorable opinion of China, while fourteen% of the Chinese say they take a positive view of Japan. In both countries positive views of the other nation have decreased since 2006.

Sino-Japanese contempt can also be seen in a regional context. Influenced by history, economical ties and electric current events, Asian publics' views of each other vary widely.

Australia has potent economic ties with both Communist china and Japan. China accounts for 34% of Commonwealth of australia's exports, while Japan is Commonwealth of australia'due south second-largest export market, accounting for eighteen% of Australian exports. Well-nigh eight-in-ten Australians (79%) voice a favorable stance of Japan. Merely only 52% express positive sentiment about China.

Indians are also more positive on Japan than on China. A plurality of Indians take a favorable view of Japan (44%), while a much smaller share (22%) see Japan in a negative low-cal. Cathay, on the other hand, gets more negative reviews in Republic of india (36%) than positive reviews (31%). About a tertiary of the Indian public expresses no opinion on China or Japan.

These are the central findings of a Pew Enquiry Eye survey of 7,618 respondents in four countries: China, Japan, Australia and India. The survey was conducted Apr 6 to May 29, 2016.

Largely negative stereotypes

Stereotypes tin can reveal a keen deal well-nigh the assumptions, sometimes biased or prejudiced, that influence how people view members of other groups.

In the instance of Cathay and Japan, publics tend to concord largely negative stereotypes of 1 another. The Chinese and the Japanese encounter each other equally violent. Roughly eight-in-10 Japanese describe the Chinese as big-headed, while seven-in-ten Chinese see the Japanese in that calorie-free. Notably, near three-quarters of the Japanese say the Chinese are nationalistic. Simply only well-nigh four-in-ten Chinese associate that discussion with the Japanese. Neither public sees the other equally honest.

A generation gap exists among the Japanese in their views of the Chinese. Older Japanese – those ages 50 and older – are more likely than Japanese ages 18 to 34 to come across the Chinese every bit nationalistic. And older Japanese are less likely than the younger generation to believe that the Chinese are hardworking or mod.

History remains a neuralgic issue in Sino-Japanese relations. Seven decades later on the end of World State of war II, the 2 publics have starkly differing perceptions of whether Nihon has expressed adequate regret for its wartime behavior.

Roughly one-half the Japanese say their state has apologized sufficiently for its military deportment during the 1930s and 1940s. And such sentiment is up 13 percentage points since 2006. The Chinese run into this issue quite differently. Just ten% of Chinese believe Japan has apologized enough. And the difference betwixt Japanese and Chinese sentiment has grown from 37 points to 43 points in the past decade.

Not only do perceptions of the countries' shared history differ, but expectations for the future of the Sino-Japanese human relationship are also largely negative. Eight-in-x Japanese (80%) and near vi-in-ten Chinese (59%) are concerned that territorial disputes betwixt China and its neighbors could lead to a military machine conflict.

Japan'southward partisan split up

Japanese attitudes toward China are marked by partisan divides. Supporters of the country's bourgeois Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) are more critical of China than are supporters of the opposition Autonomous Political party of Nippon (DPJ). Fully 46% of Japanese who place with the ruling LDP have a very unfavorable view of China. Only 30% of those who support the opposition DPJ share such intense negativity.

Notably, those who identify with the LDP are also more critical of Republic of korea than are backers of the DPJ.

LDP and DPJ supporters also differ on Chinese nationalism: DPJ adherents are far more probable than LDP backers to run across the Chinese as nationalistic (87% vs. 72% respectively).

In improver, LDP supporters (59%) are more likely than DPJ adherents (47%) to believe that Japan has apologized sufficiently for its military actions in the 1930s and 1940s. For their part, DPJ supporters are much more likely to say that Japan has not apologized sufficiently. And while 22% of those with the LDP say in that location is nothing Tokyo needs to apologize for, but 12% of DPJ backers agree.

Bitchy views of each other

Just 11% of Japanese limited a favorable view of Red china today. And over the past decade, the average favorability of China among Japanese has been just eighteen%.

Japanese animosity toward China varies somewhat by generation. Older Japanese – those ages 50 and older – are particularly unfavorable toward Cathay (48% very unfavorable). Japanese ages 18 to 34 are less intensely negative (32% very unfavorable).

For their role, the Chinese likewise take little regard for Japan. Today, only fourteen% voice a favorable stance of their Asian neighbor, in line with the average of available information over the past decade.

Both the Japanese and the Chinese see their other major Asian neighbors more positively than they exercise each other, though they still often view other neighbors in a negative low-cal too.

More than half (54%) of Japanese accept a favorable opinion of India, down from 65% in 2006.

In contrast, only 27% of Japanese express a favorable view of South korea. The legacy of Japan's colonial occupation of Korea remains a sore bespeak in bilateral relations. And Seoul has recently pressed Tokyo to accept greater responsibility for "comfort women," Korean women pressed into work equally sex workers during Earth War II. This may explain why the 2016 favorability of South Korea in Japan is roughly half the positive Japanese sentiment (56%) expressed in 2006.

In stark contrast, 55% of Chinese voice a favorable opinion of South Korea. Such sentiment has decreased slightly from 2006 (63%).

The Chinese are far less positively disposed toward Bharat. Just 26% hold a favorable view of their southern neighbor, with whom China has had numerous territorial disputes for more than a half century. Over the last decade Chinese opinion of India has drifted downwardly from 33% favorable in 2006.

Chinese-Japanese stereotypes

The Chinese and Japanese have held fairly strong and often negative stereotypes of each other for some time. And in some instances these views have worsened over the past decade.

In 2006, one-half of Japanese viewed the Chinese as violent. In 2016, roughly seven-in-ten Japanese saw the Chinese in that negative light. In addition, fully 74% of Japanese ages 50 and older come across the Chinese as fierce, while sixty% of Japanese ages 18 to 34 view the Chinese in that manner.

Roughly eight-in-ten Japanese associate arrogance with the Chinese. Only almost two-thirds said the Chinese were arrogant a decade ago.

More than half-dozen-in-ten Japanese (64%) thought the Chinese were hardworking in 2006, just now only around four-in-ten (42%) view them in that mode. Once again, it is older Japanese who are more critical (although older Japanese are more than probable to voice no stance): Simply 35% of Japanese ages 50 and older associate the aspect hardworking with the Chinese, while 60% of younger Japanese see the Chinese in that lite.

Largely unchanged among Japanese is the belief that the Chinese are modern: 29% said that well-nigh the Chinese 10 years ago, and 25% hold that stance today.

Japanese sentiment toward the Chinese has changed slightly on perceptions of the Chinese beingness nationalistic. In 2006, 82% believed the Chinese were nationalistic. Today 76% encounter them that way. A generation gap divides this Japanese perception: 80% of older Japanese say the Chinese are nationalistic, while 65% of younger Japanese agree. And 87% of the DPJ and 72% of the LDP supporters run across the Chinese as nationalistic.

The Chinese too subscribe to negative stereotypes of the Japanese. Seven-in-10 or more Chinese associate violence (74%) and arrogance (lxx%) with the Japanese. The former view is upward 9 percentage points since 2006.

Simply half the Chinese meet the Japanese equally modernistic, down from roughly two-thirds a decade agone. And the proportion of Chinese (34%) who encounter the Japanese as hardworking has nearly halved since 2006 (61%). As a point of comparison, in a 2015 Pew Research Center survey, 94% of Americans believed the Japanese to be hardworking.

At the aforementioned time, the Chinese have become less critical of Japanese nationalism. Roughly two-thirds of Chinese thought the Japanese were nationalistic in 2006; around four-in-ten see them that way today.

Notably, only 15% of the Chinese believe the Japanese are honest, unchanged from a decade agone. The Japanese concur the Chinese in a similarly low regard – 12% view them equally honest – and this is roughly one-half the number who found the Chinese honest 10 years ago. (In the 2015 survey 71% of Americans saw the Japanese every bit honest.)

Strategic perceptions: Looking back, looking forward

Japanese amende for its activities in Cathay earlier and during World State of war Two is an ongoing source of friction in Sino-Japanese relations. The Japanese believe they have expressed regret for their beliefs, while the Chinese disagree.

Among the Japanese people, 53% say they have apologized plenty for their country'south military actions during the 1930s and 1940s. Such sentiment is up from 40% in 2006. Over that time period, the proportion of the public that believes Japan has not apologized sufficiently has fallen by 21 percentage points, from 44% to 23%. Notably, one-in-half-dozen Japanese (17%) say no apology is necessary.

The Chinese run into Tokyo's state of war-related penitence quite differently. Roughly 3-quarters (77%) say Japan has not adequately expressed regret, and such Chinese sentiment is largely unchanged since 2006. Simply ten% believe Tokyo has apologized plenty.

Sino-Japanese frictions are not only an result of historical concern. In Eastward Asia such tensions remain an always-present worry as Beijing and Tokyo engage in a prolonged dispute about who has sovereignty over the Senkaku or Diaoyu islands in the E China Bounding main.

8-in-ten Japanese are very (35%) or somewhat (45%) concerned that territorial disputes between Communist china and neighboring countries could pb to a military conflict. Simply 19% are not as well concerned or not concerned at all. Notably, 42% of people ages 50 and older are very concerned, merely just 28% of Japanese ages 18 to 34 are similarly concerned.

The Chinese are somewhat less worried. Roughly six-in-ten are very concerned (18%) or somewhat concerned (41%). Notably, intense concern among the Japanese about a potential conflict is most twice that establish amongst the Chinese. And twice every bit many Chinese every bit Japanese are not too concerned or not concerned at all.

Of course, territorial disputes between China and its neighboring countries involve more nations that just Japan. In a 2015 Pew Research Center survey, 91% of Filipinos and 83% of Vietnamese were worried that such disputes – which for these nations also involve China'south territorial claims in the Southward Communist china Sea – could lead to a military conflict. In S Korea, 78% were similarly concerned near China's territorial ambitions.